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**Men of War for Missions of Peace:
Naval Forces in Support of
United Nations Resolutions**



**Commander D.L.W. Sim,
Royal Navy**

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MEN OF WAR FOR MISSIONS OF PEACE:
NAVAL FORCES IN SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS

by

D. Leslie W. Sim, Commander, Royal Navy

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**MEN OF WAR FOR MISSIONS OF PEACE:
NAVAL FORCES IN SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS**

Unlike many reports published by the Strategic Research Department, this report is not primarily meant for those steeped in naval operations. Rather it is a primer about those capabilities which naval forces have which can benefit and support United Nations Operations. As such, it is a valuable addition to a growing body of literature concerned with UN operations.

In recent years the Naval War College has assumed a leadership position in matters dealing with maritime peacekeeping operations (having sponsored two major international conferences on the subject and co-sponsored a third in association with the State Department and Army War College). The College has also been instrumental in forging new ties with the Russian Navy in matters involving UN sponsored operations through trilateral simulations with them and the Royal Navy.

Commander Sim has been intimately involved in all these projects and was the ideal scholar to pursue this subject. I trust his efforts will continue to assist both naval planners and peacekeepers for years to come.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "Donald C.F. Daniel", is positioned above the typed name.

Donald C.F. Daniel
Director
Strategic Research Department
Center for Naval Warfare Studies

Abstract of

MEN OF WAR FOR MISSIONS OF PEACE: NAVAL FORCES IN SUPPORT OF UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS

This paper explores and explains, for the benefit of a non-naval reader, how the capabilities and limitations of naval forces fit into the current military peace support environment. Much work continues in the international community to identify the paradigm which will provide the backdrop for future peace support operations. This paper traces the evolution of the current peace support environment in the light of foundational Charter provisions for the use of military force, the subsequent development of the technique of peacekeeping, and identifies the significance of "consent" in post Cold War operations. Utilizing the resultant model, the paper identifies appropriate naval missions in each category of environment and illustrates such use of naval forces with historical examples. More detailed information on several past naval peace support and enforcement operations is contained in Appendix A to provide study material for planners of future naval missions. The concluding chapter recommends some measures to be taken to improve the ability of naval forces to cooperate together in multinational naval peace support operations.

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**MEN OF WAR FOR MISSIONS OF PEACE:
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The aim of this paper is to examine and explain, for the benefit of a non-naval reader, the contributions which naval forces can and do make to military operations conducted in support of United Nations resolutions. The paper will examine the current operational environment in order to identify relevant naval capabilities and missions. It will conclude with some proposed planning guidelines to facilitate such operations in the future.

This work complements and arose out of a project undertaken by the Strategic Research Department for the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies at Brown University. The project provides a naval input to the Institute's effort to refine its report, *A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993*.

This paper draws and builds upon previous studies undertaken by the Strategic Research Department, particularly *The Employment of Maritime Forces in Support of United Nations Resolutions* by Larry Bockman, Barry Coombs and Andrew Forsyth.

To establish the background against which these operations must take place, the first chapter discusses the Charter provisions for using force; the development of peacekeeping outside the Charter; the current operational environment in which these operations are conducted; the special impact of "consent" on peace support missions; and the future of such operations.

The second chapter more clearly defines the capabilities of navies and coast

guards; discusses how they operate to best effect; identifies which of these capabilities are most appropriate in specific situations (including the unique value of general purpose combatants such as frigates and destroyers); and provides some operational factors to consider when utilizing naval combatants in support of UN missions. The third chapter builds on the first two by providing a more in depth look at missions and giving historical examples of such operations.

The concluding chapter draws together theory and practice to establish some basic building blocks upon which coalition naval forces can be established. Appendix A discusses in greater detail the cases mentioned in Chapter III and provides additional examples of naval operations which may be useful in planning future maritime peacekeeping missions.

Charter Provisions for Use of Military Force

The United Nations Charter calls upon member states to refrain from use of force,¹ except in self-defense (Article 51) and to settle their differences by peaceful means. Methods for achieving this are laid down in a series of articles in Chapter VI of the document. The Charter also makes provision for a collective security scheme through Article 43, which calls upon member states to provide forces to the organization. Article 43 enjoined member states to "undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agreements,

armed forces, assistance and facilities. . . ."^{*} Article 47 established a Military Staff Committee (MSC), consisting of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council (or their representatives). This body was to have been responsible for ". . . the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council."

In matters of international peace, most security mechanisms provided for in the Charter, and described above have never effectively or consistently come into play. Exigencies of the Cold War quickly made the MSC moribund. Although it met once in late 1990 to discuss the naval blockade of Iraq,² otherwise since the days of the Korean War, it has only met fortnightly for a few minutes to fix the date of its next meeting.

Development of "Peacekeeping"

The term "peacekeeping" does not appear in the UN Charter, and the first so-

^{*} "Article 43 is mandatory. It creates a legal obligation for member states to make available to the Security Council forces, assistance and facilities, and to do so in accordance with a special agreement or agreements. It creates a legal obligation for states to negotiate such agreements on the initiative of the Security Council "as soon as possible." Henkin, et. al., *International Law*, 3rd ed., (St. Paul, MN: West Publishing Co, 1993), p. 1003.

The Military Staff Committee did make a report to the Security Council, at their request, in 1947 with proposals for UN military forces. The report indicated broad agreement among the members of the MSC over overall purpose and command arrangements, but "disagreement as to overall strength and composition of the forces." Jeffrey Sands, *Blue Hulls: Multinational Naval Cooperation and the United Nations*. (Alexandria, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, 1993), p. B-6.

called peacekeeping operation occurred during the Suez Crisis.* Due to Security Council deadlock, it was authorized by the General Assembly under the "Uniting for peace" Resolution (1950). The principles of what is now sometimes referred to as "classic" or "traditional" peacekeeping were: peacekeeping forces could only deploy with the consent of **all** belligerent parties; participating nations' peacekeeping troops had to represent a spread of regional interests without "Permanent Five" contribution; the peacekeepers had to remain impartial and stay out of internal affairs and finally, peacekeepers could only use force in self-defense.

The UN's method for managing peacekeeping was also a product of the Cold War. The first peacekeeping force, as well as all subsequent ones, came under the command of the United Nations Secretary-General. Command in the field was exercised by a Force Commander appointed by the Secretary-General with the Security Council's consent. This *modus operandi* effectively bypassed Charter provisions for the allocation and direction of forces.

Because of the need to gain consent of all belligerent parties, and of the need to have nations voluntarily contribute forces to each peacekeeping operation, mandates are generally compromises acceptable to all parties — contributing nations, factions in dispute, the Secretariat and Security Council members. This has meant a departure

* Prior to the first peacekeeping force, UNEF 1 (first UN Emergency Force), which was created in the aftermath of the Suez Crisis, there had been earlier United Nations sanctioning of military forces. These were: UNTSO (UN Truce Supervision Organization) formed in June 1948, UNMOGIP (UN Military Observer Group India and Pakistan) formed in January 1949 and the UN sanctioned military operations in response to North Korean aggression in 1950-1.

from the principle that ". . . a mandate is devised and underwritten, according to the needs of a problem rather than to the individual interests of nations."³ Furthermore without a functional MSC and negotiated military forces, the UN has no system for conducting a properly structured military planning process.

The Operational Environment

Since the end of the Cold War, the peacekeeping environment has changed significantly. The number of operations has increased enormously (15 missions 1948-1990, 18 missions 1990-1993) and there are presently 70,000 peacekeepers deployed in the field with the potential for this to rise to 100,000.⁴ More importantly, the nature of the conflicts and the range of tasks peacekeepers have been asked to accomplish have also undergone revolution: ending the bitter, internecine civil warfare in Bosnia, Somalia and Cambodia; assisting in the provision of humanitarian relief and safe havens; and helping rebuild the collapsed infrastructure of failed states. In Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia, the hitherto essential condition of consent among all the parties was either missing or broke down at an early stage. This reduction in reliance on the consent of the parties may be a result of two influences.

The first is the more robust attitude taken by the UN and member nations in the euphoric days after the collapse of the Soviet Union and following on from the successful UN-mandated action against Iraq. In January 1992, in the aftermath of the Gulf War, the Security Council called upon the Secretary-General to prepare an analysis of, and make recommendations on how to proceed with, peace support

matters. The Secretary-General's report, delivered in June 1992, was titled *An Agenda for Peace*. This ambitious agenda in addition to providing, for the first time, definitions of a number of "peacekeeping terms," (Table 1.1) outlined a "wider mission" for the organization. It called for members to ". . . bring into being, through negotiations, the special agreements foreseen in Article 43 of the Charter, whereby member states undertake to make armed forces . . . available to the Security Council . . . on a permanent basis." The Secretary-General also proposed member states forming stand-by forces into "peace-enforcement" units to be placed under his command when required.* The Secretary-General in addition indicated the need for a new approach to matters of sovereignty stating, "The time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty . . . has passed; its theory was never matched by reality."⁵

The second influence which has caused UN authorized forces to operate short of enforcement, but in an environment where universal consent for their action is lacking, is to be found in the nature of parties involved in intrastate conflict.

Clausewitz emphasized that diplomacy and negotiation must continue during warfare, but he also was keenly aware that during conflict perceptions always diverge from reality. Victory or defeat on the battlefield, deification of own objectives and diabolization of the enemy all work to distort viewpoints and goals. The environment encountered in a civil war or during strife emerging from the collapse of a state has

* Before being elected, Mr Clinton was an ardent supporter of strengthening the UN in the area of peace operations, and he called for "the creation of a small 'rapid deployment force' for United Nations missions." However, PDD 25 completely reversed this stance.

already undergone this distortion. Furthermore, when seen from the point of view of an insurgent faction, it may be that negotiation and diplomacy in this environment have been displaced from their normal position in interstate conflict. Warring factions have likely resorted to violence as an early course of action in order to establish their identity or claims. Such organizations may never have experienced "normalcy" and may not have developed the expertise or the organs to function other than as an armed faction.

Given either the breakout of civil war or regime collapse, there is a high likelihood that for the parties and interests involved the *status quo* is conflict. Peaceful settlement of the dispute through compromise is unlikely to be achieved until a certain amount of fighting has run its course, scores have been settled, territory gained and borders redrawn. It is very difficult in this type of situation, then, to either achieve consent from all parties for UN presence on the ground in the first place, or should that consent be received, to manage to retain it over any length of time, since the warring factions may be faced with loss of position and authority by the very presence of the UN force. Notwithstanding, the UN cannot opt out of recognizing and attempting to deal with situations which do not conveniently fit into the categories of low level "traditional" peacekeeping or high level enforcement action. These mid level scenarios are likely to be a semi-permanent feature of the post-Cold War international scene and humanitarian considerations, the "CNN factor" or political pressure from its membership will continue to successfully pressure the UN to engage in this environment with military forces.

The Impact of Consent on Missions

Since most operations prior to 1990 were "traditional" missions, the significance of obtaining the consent of all parties involved was not fully appreciated. We now know it has a great effect on military operations conducted in support of United Nations resolutions and the extent of consent can be used to categorize the environment in which such operations take place.

When entering the arena of civil war or state collapse, the critical factor for military forces is whether the parties consent to the UN action. This will define the posture of UN authorized forces and any modification of this situation may change the capability of UN forces to continue their planned mission.

If we examine the Secretary-General's definitions of "peacekeeping" terms — which will be used throughout this paper — we will see that Preventive Diplomacy, Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding are actions which span the spectrum of consent — Peacemaking and Peace Enforcement however, do not.

TABLE 1.1 PEACEKEEPING TERMS

CONSENSUAL

NON-CONSENSUAL

PREVENTIVE DIPLOMACY

ACTION TO PREVENT DISPUTES FROM ARISING BETWEEN PARTIES,
TO PREVENT EXISTING DISPUTES FROM ESCALATING INTO CONFLICTS,
AND TO LIMIT THE SPREAD OF THE LATTER WHEN THEY OCCUR.

PEACEKEEPING

THE DEPLOYMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS PRESENCE IN THE FIELD,
HITHERTO WITH THE CONSENT OF ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED,
NORMALLY INVOLVING UNITED NATIONS MILITARY AND/OR POLICE
PERSONNEL AND FREQUENTLY CIVILIANS AS WELL.

PEACEBUILDING

ACTION TO IDENTIFY AND SUPPORT STRUCTURES WHICH WILL TEND
TO STRENGTHEN AND SOLIDIFY PEACE IN ORDER TO AVOID A RELAPSE
INTO CONFLICT.

PEACEMAKING

ACTION TO BRING HOSTILE
PARTIES TO AGREEMENT,
ESSENTIALLY THROUGH SUCH
PEACEFUL MEANS AS THOSE
FORESEEN IN CHAPTER VI OF
THE CHARTER.

PEACE ENFORCEMENT

ACTION TAKEN BY THE ARMED
FORCES OF MEMBER STATES
UNDER CHAPTER VII TO
RESTORE PEACE.

Since the UN may call for military action in support of its resolutions across the spectrum of consent, for the purposes of military planning we must examine which missions may be undertaken in each environment.

John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, in their handbook entitled *Second Generation Multinational Operations*,⁶ divided UN operations into nine categories, arranged in three levels of increasing degrees of intensity of military action. These levels and tasks were defined as follows:

Level One - The traditional tasks of observer missions and peacekeeping taking place in a consensual environment.

Level Two - The tasks of: preventive deployment, internal conflict resolution measures, military assistance to the local community, protection of humanitarian relief operations and guarantee and denial of movement. These tasks would "...not necessarily enjoy the support of all parties involved locally. *Consequently, they [the military forces deployed] have to take much more rigorous steps to reach a standard of military effectiveness that ensures their personal safety and achieves the conditions required in their operational role.*"⁷ [author's italics]

Level Three - Sanctions and High Intensity operations where "...UN forces ... are used to redress a major threat to international peace and security, sometimes using all possible means."⁸

In other words:

Low level - full consent of all local parties.

Mid Level - Partial consent/or initial full consent but liable to reneging by one or all factions.

High Level - no consent sought or required — enforcement action.

In the mid level, military forces must try to nurture and build consent for their actions, while at all times being ready to encounter and overcome direct opposition to

their actions.

Conclusion

In conclusion military forces may be called upon to operate in all levels of the peace support and enforcement environment and an approach which categorizes military tasks within the framework of the consensual environment will be used in this paper to examine the spectrum of a naval contribution to support of United Nations resolutions.

CHAPTER II

MARITIME CAPABILITIES

Introduction

This chapter explains broadly some general naval capabilities and operational factors and then goes on to look at these in the context of the three levels of United Nations operational environment.

The range of potential naval involvement in peace operations is wide. While the King of Gujurat once said, "Wars at sea are the matters of merchants — of no concern to the dignity of kings," the reality today is that aqua-space offers much potential for conflict in the future. Environmental degradation, reliance on fish protein to feed the population, disputes over marine resources, and territorial claims may be expected to escalate. Chile, for example, is promoting the contentious concept that a coastal state has rights to resource management decisions beyond its 200-mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).^{*} Japan's recent outrage over Russia's dumping of nuclear waste in the Sea of Japan, and the long-standing dispute over the Spratley Islands in the South China Sea, are further examples of international tensions on the world's oceans.

In addition to these maritime matters, naval forces have a role to play in disputes which are centered ashore. Since the end of the Cold War, maritime patrols and interception forces have been placed around Iraq, Haiti, in the Adriatic and on the

^{*} The Chilean Naval Commander in Chief, Admiral Jorge Martinez Busch has published several articles defining the concept of the "Presencial Sea."

Danube; naval forces in the river deltas of Cambodia have conducted nation-building tasks; forward staging bases were established off the coast of Somalia; and peace meetings have been conducted at sea off the coast of Bosnia.

Geography will be a deciding factor in how involved navies can become in a particular operation. In the case of an archipelagic state or a ribbon coastal state or a populated delta, i.e., wherever bodies of water — either rivers, lakes or the seas — are important lines of communication for the people of the area, then maritime forces will have a considerable role to play. But geography is not all. The conflict in the Balkans is very much a land force environment; yet deployment of aircraft carriers to the region in December 1992 by France and the UK enabled these countries to transmit clear and unambiguous signals of concern for their troops' safety without further destabilizing the precarious humanitarian relief operations ashore.

General Capabilities of Naval Forces

These examples illustrate the versatility of naval forces in contributing to missions which fall short of warfighting. Thanks to their reach, flexibility and image; their ability to deploy, poise and monitor; and their capacity to amass, intervene or withdraw, navies have often been the first force to be used in crises. Dispatching warships as opposed to land forces also sends different (but desired) political signals to domestic and international audiences. For example, US naval forces can normally be deployed for lengthy periods without raising the concern of Congress or invoking the War Powers Act.

Rear Admiral J.C. Wylie, USN, once wrote:

. . . only navies can have a benign as well as an effective general employment in times of relative peace. . . . [N]avies do not intrude upon the sovereignties of other and sometimes sensitive nations around the world.

It is difficult to imagine a . . . regiment of troops . . . a flight of bombers or fighter planes paying friendly or even casual calls on other nations around the world.⁹

We should also remember however, that even while a naval vessel is conducting such benign work as a diplomatic visit, it will have its magazines full, its complete suite of weapons and sensors available and most likely its wartime complement of personnel onboard. No visiting regiment of troops or squadron of bombers is likely to be so equipped.

This lack of intrusiveness, or "small footprint" to use the current idiom, is further enhanced by the legal regime of the high seas. Outside another state's territorial waters (generally recognized as being 12 miles), warships have freedom of movement while within territorial waters they have certain minimum rights of innocent passage. Thus naval forces can "poise" close to a coastal state, while remaining in international waters, as events ashore develop and political masters decide on courses of action. In this poised state during which specifics of action may be being debated, the mere presence of naval forces can provide reassurance or deterrence, and if such force is multinational, emphasize political legitimacy. Where the operation is essentially land-based, naval forces can provide a staging base, logistical support, and command and control facilities for the forces ashore.

General Capabilities of Warships

Naval vessels come in a range of shapes and sizes. The size of a vessel will roughly indicate its habitability, seakeeping qualities and endurance.* While small patrol boats will be constrained to operating close to shore by virtue of their weatherworthiness, their ability to conduct operations will also be limited to only a few hours or days by virtue of their lack of habitability and endurance. When a requirement for small boats exists, and they are unavailable, they may then be transported into the theater of operations as deck cargo on merchant ships. Larger, more seaworthy, vessels which are able to make their own way into theater will have their arrival time predicated by simple speed/time/distance calculations. Once in theater, their ability to stay on task either "poised" or conducting operations will depend on what underway replenishment ships have been provided to keep them topped up with fuel, food and stores. Most frigate-sized ships and above are equipped with helicopters which, by extending sensor and weapon range, add to the mother vessel's effective range and time on task. In the same way that troops are often contributed to UN-sponsored operations without sufficient combat support (or indeed sometimes even adequate basic clothing and equipment), so too some nations may commit warships without fleet support.

* While size is a good indicator of endurance and cost, technological sophistication is the true arbiter of just how much a vessel costs in dollar terms. For example, in relative terms, modern mine countermeasure vessels are probably the most expensive warships being built today. This is because of the need to equip them with the most modern electronics, capable of detecting increasingly sophisticated mine threat, while ensuring both electronics and vessel have a high degree of survivability in the event of a self-triggered mine detonation.


Individual units, while they are likely to be capable of a range of tasks, are usually configured to optimize performance in one primary mission area. The role of aircraft carriers, assault ships, submarines, destroyers, frigates and minesweepers may be widely recognized and understood. However, while destroyers and frigates remain largely general purpose warships able to carry out a wide range of tasks, some ship class designators must be combined with "type" information to give a true picture of capability, thus — *strike* aircraft carrier or *support* aircraft-carrier; *attack* or *ballistic missile* submarine; and minehunting- or minesweeping- mine countermeasure (MCM) vessel. This optimization of a warship in one primary role means that naval task forces are usually made up of several types of vessels to make a balanced force which can not only carry out the task, but also protect its high value (i.e., mission essential) units from threats along the way.

To manage a task force made up of such widely different types of vessels, the practice and development of modern sea warfare conducted in the framework of a military defense alliance (e.g., NATO) faced with a powerful and technically advanced naval threat, has evolved the Combined Warfare Commander (CWC) concept to optimize offensive and defensive power.

In a CWC-organized task force, all functions concerned with one particular warfare area are assigned to a single commander (see Figure 2.1). Thus the warfare commander charged with antiair warfare will detail air surveillance, friendly fighter tasking, and force missile assignments. When a threat develops, he will manage force reactions within this overall plan to neutralize it. There are also coordinated

arrangements for logistics, search and rescue and other task force needs.

FIGURE 2.1 COMPOSITE WARFARE CONCEPT



Integration of multinational forces to this level requires a significant degree of interoperability, however, as we shall discuss, not all naval tasks require forces to be organized in this manner.

Some Operational Factors to consider when utilizing Warships in support of United Nations Resolutions

Deployment Time

Those planning to employ naval forces in support of United Nations resolutions must of course be aware of some operational factors which affect this type of force. Reaction time is the first matter to consider. While warships and transports can carry heavier and bulkier freight than air transport, and therefore will undoubtedly be the major lift component of any sizeable operation, their arrival time in theater will

depend on speed/time/distance calculations made up of factors such as assembly time, loading time, speed of advance (usually limited to that of the slowest ship if there is a need to convoy or arrive *en masse*) and distance to be covered. However these factors can be less limiting than one might first think and the examples of the Royal Navy assembling and dispatching their Task Group to the Falklands Islands in a matter of four days and more recently the amassing of warships in a matter of hours around Haiti to enforce the UN-sponsored embargo show how rapidly the response to crisis can be. Furthermore, the sailing of a force such as the Falklands Task Group sends diplomatic signals which may be of help to the situation. Finally the transit time to the area of crisis will always prove valuable for force interoperability training.

Naval Weapons and Sensors

Naval weapons and sensors as a generalization are optimized against sea targets. While naval gunfire support of land forces is a historic role for warships, naval missile systems, radars and passive sensor systems generally do not have discrimination modes optimized for precision tasking against inland targets. Naval manned-aircraft, however, have, since their inception, been utilized in support of forces ashore, and the appearance of the Harrier vertical take-off and landing (VSTOL) aircraft enabled several mid-sized navies to join or remain in the carrier-operators club in recent years.* Submarine- and ship-launched tactical land-attack cruise missiles, remotely piloted

* India, Italy, Spain and the UK have marinized Harriers in their naval inventories. Thailand is acquiring a VSTOL capable aviation ship.

vehicles (RPV) for reconnaissance, and the advent of non-lethal technologies for warheads already enhance USN capabilities to project power and influence events ashore, and will in the future for others.

Even without possession of ideal weapon types, there are areas where navies can offer a considerable capability to land forces in Mid Level situations. Warships are useful platforms for the mounting of *ad hoc* suites of sophisticated electronic warfare equipment designed to monitor, analyze, control or interfere with land systems.

Posture

Any change in threat environment will have two major effects on naval operations. It will change the ship's internal organizational arrangements, and the external posture of the ship (which can be discerned from the operating modes of its weapons and sensors). Warships generally have three internal alert states which govern the readiness of their weapons, sensors and personnel for warfighting tasks. These are generically: a cruising state, a defense state and an action state. As the local environment changes from benign to threatening to one of actual or imminent attack, the ship's posture also changes. That said, in cases where units performing a task specific capabilities (but do not form part of a balanced force) — for example, when conducting independent coastal patrol or mine clearing missions — it may be necessary to provide protection by assignation of frigates or destroyers as a covering force.

Interoperability

The need for, and expectation of, multinationality in UN operations raises the issue of interoperability. It may be that the tasks required of naval forces can be

fulfilled by geographic allocation of areas of operation. If this is not the case, then composition and allocation of duties within such a multinational force will be driven by the capability of the potential threat and the counter-capability of individual UN units.

The spectrum of levels of integration of multinational naval forces may be characterized as:

independent \Rightarrow coordinated \Rightarrow cooperative \Rightarrow composite

While naval operations in support of UN resolutions may be conducted completely independently by each participating nation, this is unlikely.

Coordinated Operations. Multinational naval forces may be unable to integrate to any significant degree due to language, doctrinal or equipment incompatibility or through unwillingness at the political level. In these circumstances, allocation of sea areas to individual nations contributing naval forces will enable many naval missions to take place. Offshore support, MCM, patrol, embargo, defended lane and escort duties may all be conducted in this manner. The sharing of information about plans, methods, operations and intelligence will undoubtedly enhance efficiency in the overall execution of the mission. Coordination may be achieved by United Nations action, between governments of contributing nations or at the service level of nations involved.

Cooperative Operations. Cooperation implies a higher degree of fusion between

contributing nations. This involves planning and interaction to ensure a higher level of operational efficiency or achievement than coordination. Some integration of national naval capability may be undertaken, although national command and control of naval units is likely to remain with national command authorities (NCA). A good example of a cooperative naval mission occurred when several European states belonging to the WEU conducted minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf in 1987-8. This was described as a "process of concertation"* by the WEU and involved three levels of this process between the contributing nations. Local commanders conducted "concerted" operations in the Gulf. At a higher military level, representatives of the five naval staffs in each of the capitals met to decide what should be dealt with locally, and what should go to the political level. The general framework and limitation of cooperation was decided by senior officials representing ministers.

Composite Operations. If there is a high degree of political commitment to a coalition or alliance there may well be transfer of some forms of command and control of naval units to the alliance, nation or commander leading the coalition. While this may result in a high level of integration of naval forces, depending on the levels of

* Eric Grove, in an article describing these events from which this information is gleaned, states

the dictionary defines *concerted* as an adjective meaning *mutually planned* and *arranged in parts*. Converting this adjective into a noun seemed to describe the WEU activities rather well.

Eric Grove, "Common Security Studies No. 2," *Maritime Strategy and European Security*, 1990, p. 62.

interoperability among the force, this is not necessarily so. In a potentially high threat environment, contributing countries cannot permit *ad hoc* arrangements just for the sake of multinationality which might reduce the protection provided to their expensive warships - expensive in terms of both equipment, personnel and national prestige. This may result in the coalition naval force having a core of fully interoperable nations' ships operating compositely in the high threat area, or conducting offensive missions, with other nations conducting ancillary tasks at the periphery. This may give the coalition a distinctly regional or alliance flavor.

Integration of forces may also be a reflection of a nation's political support of either the Security Council resolution or of the interpretation put upon it by other coalition partners. During *Desert Shield* and *Desert Storm* naval operations, the layers of "integration" and "political support" could be discerned by how far into the Persian Gulf individual nation's ships operated. The table below shows broad requirements for each method of organization.


Table 2.1 - Mission integration requirements

	Common operational language	C2	ROE	Common doctrine	Interoperable equipment	Common training
Independent						
Coordinated	✓		✓			
Cooperative	✓		✓	✓		✓
Composite	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

Given the above requirements, where it is necessary to mount an operation

catering for several levels of integration, it may be possible to allocate tasks to nations' naval contingents utilizing a layered approach, such as evolved in *Desert Shield/Storm*, in order to match political requirements and interoperability capability. An example of this approach is illustrated in Figure 2.2.

FIGURE 2.2 INTEROPERABILITY & INTEGRATION



<u>Nation:</u>	<u>Mission:</u>
A,B,C	1,2,3,4
D,E,F	2,3,4
G,H,I	3,4
J,K,L	4

While there is probably only one military alliance in existence — NATO — which has practiced multinational combat operations regularly enough to rely on fully

integrated force composition routinely in all environments, the various combined bilateral and multilateral exercises which go on among the navies of the world provide building blocks of interoperability which give navies a head start over most ground forces in this matter. The US Navy, being the world's largest, undoubtedly has the most interaction within the multinational exercise scene. A recent report on Multinational Naval Cooperation Options gives an idea of the activity going on in this field (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2. USN Worldwide combined Exercise Totals (1991 and 1992)¹⁰

Exercises	1991	1992
Bilateral	73	101
Multinational	29	29
Total Scheduled	102	130
Total Unscheduled	86	86
Combined Totals	188	216

In 1993, the USN conducted 168 exercises with a total of 53 countries.

In addition, other important initiatives are taking place in this field presaged by, for example, the series of annual US, UK and Russian naval war games which were initiated in 1993.*

Command and Control

Any discussion of command and control arrangements of naval forces must begin by establishing the precise meanings of the terms used. The definitions of command and control terms given below in Table 2.3 are taken from NATO doctrine

* The first game in the series took place at HMS DRYAD in May 1993 and the second occurred at the U.S. Naval War College, Newport RI, in May 1994. Scenarios employed in the 1993 and 1994 games both centered on operations in support of UN mandates.

and comprehensively cover the topic.

24. Table 2.3. - Command and Control Definitions

Full Command - The military authority and responsibility of a superior officer to issue orders to subordinates. It covers every aspect of military operations and administration and exists only within national services. The term "command" when used internationally, implies a lesser degree of authority than when it is used in a purely national sense. It follows that no NATO commander has full command over forces that are assigned to him. This is because nations, in assigning forces to NATO, assign only operational command or operational control.

Operational Command(OPCOM) - The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders; to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include administrative command or logistical responsibility. Operational command may also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.

Operational Control(OPCON) - The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include the authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control.

Tactical Command(TACOM) - The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.


Tactical Control(TACON) - The detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.

Full warfighting integration of naval forces (e.g., CWC-type) requires a nation to delegate at least OPCON and TACON of its force contribution to the naval multinational Force Commander. Transfer of OPCON and TACON will depend on a variety of factors at the political level, but its smooth implementation at the force level will depend on three factors: communications connectivity (which includes the ability to exchange data electronically); common doctrine or standard operating procedures (SOPs); and commonality of ROE.

Where naval units are in direct support of land forces operating under the


OPCON of a United Nations Force Commander, it is possible that national governments may nevertheless retain OPCON and TACON of their naval forces. This was the case in naval operations in the Adriatic in support of UNPROFOR ground troops where, in addition to the NATO naval force, France, Great Britain and the US operated their aircraft carrier task groups fully under national command and control. To further complicate the picture, aircraft taking off from these carriers to meet *Deny Flight* tasking chopped to UN (contracted out to NATO) TACON during their sorties. While these arrangements indicate the flexibility of nations to meet the political and operational imperatives of contributing military assets to peace operations, it must be remembered that there may be a price to pay in reaction times when something unexpected happens, due to the loss of "unity of command."

**FIGURE 2.3 LOW LEVEL FORCE C2
ENGAGED IN PATROLLING**




A typical arrangement for naval force C2 in the three levels of peace support and enforcement operational environments might be as illustrated in Figures 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5.

**FIGURE 2.4 MID-LEVEL FORCE C2
ENGAGED IN OFFSHORE SUPPORT**



**FIGURE 2.5 HIGH LEVEL FORCE C2
COALITION SEA WARFARE/ENFORCEMENT**



Having examined some general warship capabilities and operating factors, it is now pertinent to see how these fit into the various levels of environment encountered in supporting United Nations resolutions.

Low Level Maritime Capabilities

Low level operations rely on two qualities to avoid upsetting consensual arrangements and the often fragile peace which have led to their establishment. First, the peace force must be seen to be impartial and, second, its operating posture must be low key in order to avoid antagonizing local factions into aggressive action. Impartiality can be emphasized by the use of a multinational force and we have discussed the flexibility naval forces have to operate in this manner.

The other quality necessary for low level operations is the ability to appear non-threatening to local factions in order to ensure their continued support for the mandate. Here naval forces benefit from the small impact their presence has on sovereignty. The regime of the high seas, whereby naval vessels can remain outside territorial waters, allows naval forces to position reserves and support in international waters. Often, in addition, general purpose vessels such as frigates and destroyers (which have powerful warfighting abilities) are so familiar to most populations that their presence does not raise undue alarm. Thus they can be usefully tasked to conduct or support low level missions.

Mid Level Maritime Capabilities

In a fragile consensual environment short of high intensity operations, peace forces must continue to operate using minimum force, but they should also have capability to defend themselves and their charges against local factions if necessary. Here again several qualities of maritime forces lend themselves to the environment.

First is the fact that warships at all times, even when conducting non-warfighting tasks, operate combat ready. In addition, modern frigate-sized and larger warships possess considerable firepower so there is generally no need to augment their weapons to cope with a threatening environment. Most modern frigates will be equipped with surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, helicopters and medium-range guns offering a comprehensive package for defense of friendly forces at sea, provision of power projection offshore and limited support of land forces. The requirement to present threatening force as well as the need, if force is used, to be non-escalatory, requires sophisticated surveillance and analysis of the local environment and traffic patterns in order to enable engagements to be selective. This should be within the capability of most warships' combat systems, along with differing levels of ability to exchange data automatically with other naval, air and land units. General purpose warships will, however, be challenged to conduct extensive analysis of electronic data garnered from ashore or to conduct standoff precision attacks inshore (unless these are delivered from manned aircraft or there is a land-attack cruise missile armed vessel in the force). As more naval services focus on the littoral warfare environment, these capabilities are likely to become more common. The presence of specialist naval intelligence gathering vessels, which several forces are equipped with, and the general capability of units to receive filtered information from national sources — by means of long-range communications or space-based systems — are gap-fillers in the meantime.

High Level Maritime Capabilities

At the high level, where enforcement operations take place, navies can impose

sanctions and conduct high intensity or combat operations.

Sanctions

The imposition of an embargo calls for the policing force to have endurance, since embargoes generally take considerable time to begin to have an effect. The ability of most navies to be able to remain on task at sea for extended periods of time through the development of methods for refuelling and resupplying warships at sea is an essential skill for this type of operation. While aircraft, either operating from ships or from a nearby land base, are extremely effective in searching out and monitoring large sea areas during an embargo operation — given suitable weather conditions — there will always be a need for surface ships to be available to maintain a continuous deterrent presence and to conduct the stop and search part of the mission. Searching a single modern bulk carrier takes several hours and searches will always be needed since, with over 90% of the world's trade goods being moved by sea, there is likely to be a variety of legitimate commercial shipping plying their trade in the vicinity of the embargo. In the Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) which took place over seven months during *Desert Shield/Storm*, 165 coalition ships challenged more than 7,500 merchant vessels, boarded and inspected 964 of these but only diverted 51.¹¹

High Intensity Operations

While high intensity or combat operations are likely to have the deployment of ground forces at their heart, naval forces will no doubt play a major part in enabling or assisting such ground maneuvers to take place. Sea warfighting designed to gain local sea control against any adversary equipped with naval forces will be necessary to

keep sea lines of communication (SLOCs) open. This will enable sealift, amphibious operations, offshore support and offshore power projection to take place where the theater of operations is within striking range of naval forces* The large scale of forces required for enforcement operations are likely to operate in a multinational coalition which will be directed by either by a lead nation or a military alliance. High Intensity operations were conducted by multinational naval forces in both the Korean War and in *Operation Desert Storm*. In both these operations naval forces established control of the sea around the enemy's coast and then used access to his coastline to project power to enhance the land campaign.**

Conclusion

In conclusion, this chapter has sought to explain some of the qualities possessed by naval forces which are particularly useful in the context of operating in support of United Nations resolutions. After examining some defining operational factors concerning the employment of warships, naval capabilities and limitations were put into the context of the three levels of mission which had been discussed in Chapter

* The United States Navy, with its considerable striking power, deems anywhere within 650 nautical miles of the coastal region within the effective range of its naval forces.

** Interestingly, again in both campaigns, the enemy's use of mine warfare disrupted the allied navies control of the sea. In the Korean War, the North Korean minefield laid off Wonsan held up a US amphibious landing for 10 days and caused the US Advance Force Commander to signal, "The US Navy has lost command of the seas in Korean waters." In *Desert Storm* the Iraqi sea mine threat caused major damage to two US ships (USS Tripoli and USS Princeton) and, in the words of the DOD report on the War, "...mine warfare had a considerable effect on Coalition maritime operations in the Persian Gulf." The bulk of Iraq's mine inventory comprised copies of pre-World War I contact mines.

One. The next chapter will look in more detail at particular naval missions or tasks suitable for each level.

CHAPTER III

MARITIME MISSIONS

This chapter will identify missions for naval forces in each level of consensual environment and will cite some historical instances of such missions.

Low Level - Consensual Environment

Missions carried out by naval units in support of UN mandates and taking place in an environment of consent among the factions involved may be split into two groups. The first group consists of those tasks which are essentially passive observer missions. The second involves more active peacekeeping missions.

Passive Missions

Naval observer functions may consist of tasks such as monitoring a sea area, delta or riverine setting, port or harbor facilities or simply providing presence to emphasize UN involvement. These are day-to-day tasks commonly carried out by navies in support of national objectives and as such most forces should be capable of their efficient conduct. Indeed the very purpose of the combat information system fitted within a warship is to detect, analyze, identify and present to the commanding officer the position and identity of every subsurface, surface and air contact, within a given range of the vessel. Such information is required so that the commander or the command team can decide if such contacts are friendly, neutral or present a threat to the ship or force. Warships will generally be able to carry out observer missions in the cruising state of readiness, operating in their peacetime mode, and thus be able to

present their least threatening posture.

In a delta, riverine or port environment, small patrol craft will be required. Provision of this type of craft should not be a problem, given political will, as all 157 navies listed in *Jane's Fighting Ships* have harbor patrol boat type craft and, of these 157, thirty-two have units designated as patrol vessels under the major warships listing. If use of local craft* is not considered politically acceptable or suitable craft are not available, then vessels may be shipped into area.** This type of craft tends to operate in a "sortie" rather than a "deployment" mode and so will require considerable shore support in terms of logistics, C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence), and crew facilities.

Active Missions

Under this category are missions which involve active measures taken by a UN naval force operating in a consensual environment. These will in general be impartial confidence- and peacebuilding activities. Missions might include the following:

Assisting with Separation of Forces. Naval forces can assist the peace process by monitoring or conducting: separation of maritime forces (including manning or placing observers on vessels); establishing collection points for vessels, craft, personnel; collecting weapons and inspecting warships' magazines and weapon systems.

* In UNTAC (United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia) 32 Cambodian People's Armed Forces (CPAF) vessels were utilized.

** In ONUCA (UN Observer Group in Central America) four Argentine patrol craft were shipped as deck cargo to the operating area (Gulf of Fonseca). Patrol craft were also shipped to the scene of operations in the WEU Danube embargo mission.

Assisting re-establishment of civilian order. Naval forces can be tasked to run and train maritime police, coast guard and customs services. In addition, specialist vessels can conduct civil engineering tasks, provide navigational services and environmental clean-up. Amongst the most important tasks of this nature to be completed is that of mine clearance. A good example of this was the Egyptian, French, US and UK multinational mine clearance effort undertaken in the Suez Canal in 1974 which resulted in the re-opening of the Canal to merchant traffic shortly thereafter.

Humanitarian Assistance. Again, in an atmosphere of post-hostilities agreement, or prior to the outbreak of a conflict, naval forces could be utilized to provide humanitarian assistance to the populations of the region or indeed be used to evacuate foreign nationals. An example of such an operation took place off Aden in 1986 when warships and auxiliaries from France, the Soviet Union and the UK evacuated over 5000 people from over 26 countries during a 45-day period.¹²

Mid Level - Fragile Consensual Environment

As discussed above, the major difference between operations conducted in a consensual and fragile consensual environment is that, in the latter, a warship's posture will be changed to take into account the threat environment it faces. This might variously affect: appearance — upper deck weapons will now be manned and moving, personnel will wear combat gear; detectable equipment modes — fire control radars may be at standby or operating; and the ship itself will be moving in a different way — transiting and patrolling at faster speeds, altering course more often perhaps

even remaining further offshore or loitering less in a delta or riverine setting; in simple terms, the "tempo" of the way the ship does its business will have increased.

Where lightly armed or unarmed small craft are to conduct the UN-sanctioned operations, these might now have an escort of a corvette, frigate or destroyer if local threat conditions merit this.

Passive Missions

Passive missions undertaken in the Mid Level fragile consensual environment may be described as:

Preventive Deployment. In situations where there is a maritime dimension to the crisis, naval forces may be deployed in support of UN objectives with the task of showing presence and monitoring local movements much as they did in observer missions in a low level situation. Now, however, given a local maritime threat, the operational tempo with which the warships go about their task will have changed as described above. Furthermore there will be more forceful steps taken to positively identify all contacts detected within the area of interest. This will include challenging approaching contacts by electronic means and on communications circuits, as well as searching and probing by the use of aircraft. Approaching contacts which are deemed suspicious may be "warned off" their course and there may even be "no-go" zones established around individual units or groups.

Warships essentially providing support for a land force will undertake "poise" operations. This means they will hold themselves ready to deliver the agreed support which might be of a presence, combat, logistical or humanitarian nature, within the

timescale required by and agreed with the land force commander. While this alert status will be the driving force of the operational tempo of the maritime force, self-defense requirements will also be a factor.

Arguably an example of such poise operations taking place in a mid level situation is the dispatch of carriers to the Adriatic in December 1992, by France and the UK, in support of their national UNPROFOR contingents.

Active Missions

Active measures undertaken by maritime forces in a mid level environment might be as follows:

Internal Conflict Resolution Measures. Internal conflict resolution measures, which may include *military assistance to the civil authority*, comprise many tasks which may be conducted by naval units. First, naval units may be required to interpose themselves between factions in order to separate forces and lessen tensions. This could take place in coastal areas or in international waters between states, or be conducted by riverine craft in the delta or internal waters setting. Second, disarming and demobilization tasks, such as protection of rendezvous points, routes, and shore sites established for these purposes, the collection of weapons, and the examination of vessels are all tasks that naval units might satisfactorily perform. The Maritime Operations Units in UNTAC (UN Transitional Authority Cambodia) carried out just such functions.

Third, the provision of interim public services such as maritime police, customs and coast guard duties may well be essential to the re-establishment of order in a post

conflict scenario, to ensure human rights and security. Fourth, protection of commercial installations, such as offshore oil rigs, and protection of commercial practices, such as fishing and coastal or inland water trade, will also be essential matters in many cases of peacebuilding.

Given the propensity in recent years for factions possessing mines to lay them both at sea and on land, the need for mine clearance is likely to be an integral part of many UN-sponsored operations. Environmental clean-up requirements might be equally essential. Both these tasks require specialist vessels. An example of such missions taking place in a mid level situation, where there was not an agreed cease-fire between the warring nations, took place during the Iran-Iraq War. Warships of several members of the WEU swept mines in the Persian Gulf off the United Arab Emirates and off Bahrain in 1987-8.

Protection of Humanitarian Relief Operations. There have been many examples in recent history of naval forces providing primary humanitarian relief in the aftermath of natural disasters.* Of concern here, however, is the protection of established relief operations. Warships, naval craft and personnel can protect sea and river routes, ports, anchorages and harbors against disruption of sealift operations.

* Floods in Bangladesh and hurricanes in the Caribbean have seen the USN and RN provide comfort to populations by being the "fastest with the mostest" on scene by virtue of normal peacetime deployment patterns. The very fact that the vessels concerned were warships and the aid was delivered by the military may well have had a stabilizing effect and encouraged the re-establishment or maintenance of civil order.

For a detailed description of such an operation see:

Gary W. Anderson, *Operation Sea Angel: A Retrospective on the 1991 Humanitarian Relief Operation in Bangladesh*, Naval War College Strategy and Campaign Department Report 1-92. (Newport, RI: US Naval War College, 1992).

They can provide standoff land attack support for troops operating ashore within the limitations of naval weapons discussed earlier.

Examples of this type of operation include the French and British dispatch of aircraft carriers to the Adriatic in December 1992 to provide heavy guns and airpower support to national ground contingents protecting humanitarian relief operations. The subsequent utilization of aircraft from these carriers, and the USN carrier stationed in the Adriatic, to conduct sorties to enforce the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia (*Operation Deny Flight*) might be viewed as a separate example of a multinational naval contribution to humanitarian relief operations.*

Guarantee and Denial of Movement. Naval forces may be employed to guarantee or deny movement in a variety of circumstances. They might be required to establish exclusion zones at sea, either for economic purposes when enforcing an embargo, or in terms of denying access to warships and aircraft of factions in dispute. Equally they might provide escort protection to vessels proceeding through an area of maritime threat. They might also establish and protect "safe havens" either at sea or in ports and put coastal communities under cover of their own weapons. The development of anti-ballistic missiles (ABM) fitted in warships may in time offer mobile rapidly deployable protection from weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to sea and coastal areas.

Examples of maritime guarantee and denial of movement operations, in what

* In a purely national context, U.S. naval forces control of the Haitian refugee problem, and the Royal Navy's employment in managing the Vietnamese Boat peoples' influx to Hong Kong, might be set alongside these examples to illustrate the scope of naval operations in this context.

approximates to a mid level scenario, are the "Tanker War" escort operations which took place during the Iran-Iraq War and the arms embargo operations in the Adriatic conducted by NATO Standing Force and WEU ships.

High Level Operations

The two sub-divisions of this area of operations in support of UN mandates are *Sanctions* and *High Intensity Operations*.

Sanctions

Sanctions seem to be increasingly applied as leverage by the UN in order to encourage *conflict resolution*, either pre- or post-hostilities, by making factions or nations accede to the UN point of view. In recent years we have seen maritime forces implementing embargo operations around Iraq and Haiti in this manner. In both these cases, the threat to UN-sponsored naval forces was either non-existent (Haiti) or never materialized. The important point is that consent of the parties involved was not sought and indeed the naval forces in both cases were prepared and capable of carrying out their UN task in the face of direct opposition. Given the amount of world trade goods and energy resources transported by sea on a regular basis, it is highly likely that the UN will look to naval forces to conduct such tasks in the future.

High Intensity Operations

There will always be a need to be capable of gaining and holding sea control in the face of a maritime threat to friendly shipping or naval forces. While a full discussion of naval warfighting doctrine and tactics is beyond the scope of this paper

there are three particular naval functions which are worthy of consideration as they are liable to be integral to any high level United Nations support operations. These are sealift, offshore support and mine countermeasures.

Sealift. Sealift is likely to be crucial to any large scale operation. It provides the strategic capability to transport and deliver bulk equipment and supplies on a global scale. It is flexible — it can be used for prepositioning, poise and resupply — and within reason its delivery point and timing can be changed to meet changing plans. Sealift assets have the capability to offer succor and support to forces ashore on a long term basis by providing logistics, maintenance, and support functions offshore. Finally sealift is likely to be used for back-loading of United Nations support contingents, either on successful completion of the mission, or in an emergency.

Many navies have sealift capability within their inventory. When this is not the case, utilization of general commercial shipping, either by charter or through governmental co-option of national shipping assets, may be a way to provide sealift capability.

The proliferation of submarines and sea-mining capabilities — and the vulnerability of unprotected shipping to air attack in coastal areas — means that sealift assets will have to be protected in transit and in theater if any threat to their safety exists.

Offshore Support. Other typical roles fulfilled by naval forces in offshore support are:

- Air Support
- Naval Gunfire Support
- Surveillance
- Command, Control, Communications and Intel(C3I)

- Combat Search and Rescue (SAR)
- Medical Support
- Accommodation facilities
- Logistical Support

The ability of a naval force to poise in international waters and then, when required, to provide such essential support facilities to ground contingents, on a sustainable basis, is a powerful tool. Such support functions may well be mission critical, and it is essential therefore that C2 arrangements ensure that offshore support cannot be withdrawn from the land forces without prior notification to and agreement of the Force Commander who is in command of the overall operation. Due to differences in national doctrine, it may be advantageous to arrange for national land contingents to be given offshore support by their own national naval forces.

Mine Warfare. At sea the threat or the presence of mines can seriously hamper naval operations. In the Korean War, the North Korean minefield laid off Wonsan held up a US amphibious landing for 10 days. In *Desert Storm* the Iraqi sea mine threat caused major damage to two US ships (*USS Tripoli* and *USS Princeton*) and, in the words of the DOD report on the War, "... mine warfare had a considerable effect on Coalition maritime operations in the Persian Gulf."¹³

Sea mines come in a variety of forms covering the spectrum of technical sophistication. They can be laid by surface vessels (not necessarily warships), aircraft and submarines. Even in their crudest form, they are highly effective against displacement-hull vessels — e.g., the bulk of Iraq's mine inventory comprised copies of pre-World War I contact mines.

Sea mines are countered by naval forces in a variety of ways and active mine

countermeasures (MCM) are undertaken by specialist vessels, helicopters and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams of divers. A sophisticated and comprehensive mine threat may require the deployment of the whole range of MCM techniques against it.

A nation's naval MCM forces are usually tailored to meet the direct mine threat identified within that country's national military strategy. If naval units of that country deploy in support of UN-sponsored operations, they may be faced with a mine threat which their national MCM inventory is not designed to counter. Thus multinational naval cooperation in employment of MCM assets may be required from the very outset of an operation to meet the threat. This cooperation may take the form of nations working independently in assigned areas or employing their differing MCM capabilities sequentially in a common area, or finally working alongside each other as a totally integrated MCM force.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have examined the three levels of missions which span the requirements for operations in support of United Nations resolutions to identify the range of potential tasks for naval forces. These are summarized in Table 3.1. which follows.

TABLE 3.1 - NAVAL TASKS

LOW LEVEL

Passive

observe,
monitor,
provide a presence.

Active

clear mines,
separate forces,
provide safe havens,
collect weapons,
conduct environmental clean-up,
provide interim public services (police,
fire, coast guard, search & rescue,
power, medical, navigation),
provide humanitarian assistance,
conduct non-combatant evacuation
(NEO).

MID LEVEL

Passive

Observe,
Monitor,
Poise or conduct
Preventive Deployment.

Active

clear mines,
separate forces,
enforce safe havens,
disarm/demobilize,
conduct environmental clean-up,
provide interim public services (police,
fire, coast guard, search & rescue,
power, medical, navigation),
provide humanitarian assistance,
hostage rescue/evacuation,
refugee protection,
protect commercial
installations/practices,
guarantee/deny movement.

HIGH LEVEL

Sanctions
High Intensity Operations

More information on several historical instances of naval forces being employed in peace support and enforcement operations which are worthy of note are included at Appendix A.

The next chapter will identify measures to assist the arrangement of future

multinational naval operations.


CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

Planning Ahead for Future Naval Multinational Operations

Whenever a multinational naval force is assembled to participate in an operation in support of a United Nations resolution, but where the contributing nations are not prepared to place their warships under the command of a coalition leader or force commander, there will be a requirement to establish a contributing nations' multinational naval planning forum to act as the interface between National Command Authorities and operational forces. Most naval tasks can be executed by a variety of arrangements across the spectrum of cooperation and integration, but even when conducting independent operations, efficiency will be enhanced by the exchange of at least some information between nations providing naval units. A naval operations planning flow matrix might be as follows:

Force Packaging Considerations



Deployment Considerations

Already in area/transit to area (timing/protection *en route*/assembly/training)
↓

Organizational Options(Table 4.1)

Method of Organization (possibly mix of types)	Independent	Coordinated	Cooperative	Composite
Commander	NCA	NCA through a combined naval group/staff		CTF/CJTF/alliance
ROE	National	National	National or Common	Common
Common language arrangements	Not required	Not essential	Required	Required
Logistics	National	National or Combined	National or Combined	National or Combined
Communications and reporting	National (common nets between units may be useful)	Either: a. Unit ↔ NCA ↔ Combined naval group/staff or b. Unit ↔ Combined staff ↔ NCA Coordinated ops — benefit from common nets between units. Cooperative ops — require common nets between units		Units ↔ CTF/CJTF ↔ alliance/NCAs

Note: CTF — Commander, Task Force = Naval Force. CJTF — Commander, Joint Task Force = Joint Force.

Naval multinational operations, whatever the level of integration, will have their efficiency improved by the adoption of the following pre-crisis measures:

- a. Exchange or collation of information on commonality of equipment.

With priority given to compatible:

- clear communications systems
- secure communications systems
- data links

- b. Agreement on use of a common language or on interpreter/liaison officer arrangements.
- c. Exchange of doctrine publications leading to more doctrinal transparency.
- d. Design of skeletal structures for naval liaison and planning staffs to allow rapid formulation of such staffs in crisis response.
- e. Increased multinational naval training, both simulated and real, to exercise and test UN type operational scenarios.

Important work has already commenced in some of these areas. NATO, under the aegis of the Military Agency for Standardization (Navy), has produced *EXTAC 768 - Maritime Maneuvering and Tactical Procedures* for use by non-NATO navies. Work is also underway on the release of several other naval tactical publications. Colonel Gary Anderson, USMC, in his report *Operation Sea Angel: A Retrospective on the 1991 Humanitarian Relief Operation in Bangladesh* (see bibliography for details) has made recommendations for skeletal structures for Joint Staffs employed in crisis responses to humanitarian disasters.

EPILOGUE

This paper set out to inform a non-naval audience about the scope and scale of the role that naval forces can play in military operations conducted in support of United Nations resolutions. The approach taken has been to examine the arrangements for military participation in peace support and enforcement operations and the current

environment in which such actions take place. By categorizing the defining qualities of this environment into three levels, we were then able to go on to examine the capabilities and qualities of naval forces in order to identify what values they bring to such operations and to identify what tasks they can undertake. These conclusions were underpinned by brief citations of historical instances of naval forces being used in this manner.* Finally, some measures which will enhance future naval operations of this nature were identified.

The paper shows that naval forces can contribute to all levels of peace support and enforcement tasks and that their capacity to integrate and operate multinationally is a major asset in these operations. In particular, in the relatively new, complex and demanding environment of mid level operations, there is a range of tasks which can be undertaken by naval forces, to contribute to and enhance peacekeeping and peacebuilding initiatives.

* A fuller description of specific missions has been included in the appendix.

APPENDIX A

A STUDY OF PAST NAVAL PEACE SUPPORT AND ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONS

The United Nations has no standing military forces to employ in support of its resolutions, yet military capability is often required to facilitate or achieve a required United Nations goal. In this appendix I intended to examine several examples of naval forces being provided to support United Nations resolutions. The naval dimension to the Multinational Force (MFO), now operating in support of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of March 1979, will be included in the study since, although not operating in support of a United Nations brokered peace or resolution, this gives us a valuable example of an interpositional naval force supporting a peace treaty agreement.

The examples of other naval operations to be studied are:

Low Level - United Nations Observer group In Central America (ONUCA)

Mid Level - United Nations Transitional Authority Cambodia (UNTAC)
- Maritime Operations taking place in the Adriatic in support of
United Nations Resolutions (*SHARP SPEAR* and Danube
Blockade)

High Level - The Korean War
- *Operation Desert Shield/Storm*

Low Level Operations

The Multinational Force (MFO)

Introduction. Following on from the cessation of hostilities between Egyptian and Israeli forces in the October 1973, UNEF II (the Second UN Emergency Force) was created to patrol and monitor the Sinai demilitarized buffer zone. When the Security Council mandate authorizing UNEF II was due to expire in 1979, it was plain that

Security Council tensions were likely to hamper its renewal. Out of this situation the U.S. brokered an agreement with both sides to allow to the replacement of UNEF II with a "multinational force." Contributing nations were: Australia, Colombia, Fiji, France, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the United States, the United Kingdom and Uruguay. Part of the remit of this Multinational Force was to maintain freedom of navigation through the Straits of Tiran and this aspect of the operation has been handled solely by the Italian Navy.

Mandate. With no United Nations involvement, the mandate authorizing the MFO came from a protocol, signed in August 1981, which applied to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of March 1979. In the protocol, the MFO was tasked to maintain freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran, in accordance with Article V of the peace treaty. The Straits of Tiran are at the seaward entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, which gives access to the Israeli port of Eilat. The closure of this route by the Egyptians contributed to the outbreak of war between Egypt and Israel in 1967.

Force. The force which conducted the freedom of navigation task comprised four Italian "Agave" class minesweepers supported by 82 Italian naval personnel based in Sharm El Shiekh. This organization was referred to as the MFO Coastal Patrol Unit (CPU). For patrol duties, the vessels had all minesweeping equipment removed, but kept their armament of light machine guns and crew personal weapons. Three minesweepers conducted the operation while one underwent maintenance in Italy.

Conduct of Operations. The agreement made between Italy and the MFO for conduct of operations in the Straits of Tiran did not require the maritime force to

patrol the Straits continuously. The Straits were kept under continuous observation from land,¹⁴ with the Italian naval force providing one vessel patrolling at sea or at 30-minutes standby in Sharm el Sheikh harbor. The reserve patrol boat was required to remain at 2-hours notice, and the third vessel was to be at 12-hours notice in harbor.

The agreement called for the force to monitor, but not to enforce, freedom of navigation.

Command and Control. OPCON and TACON of the CPU was exercised by the CPU Commander, an Italian naval line officer of Commander rank, who was also designated the Contingent Commander. In addition, the Italian Navy appointed a senior staff officer to the MFO headquarters ashore to represent the Contingent Commander and act as liaison officer.

ROE. The naval patrol vessels operate under MFO rules of engagement.

Comments. While not a United Nations-sponsored or directed operation, the MFO provides an example of naval forces conducting classic interpositional peacekeeping duties under the aegis of a signed truce between belligerents. The threat to patrol vessels in this case was almost non-existent, allowing the naval force to operate in an operationally relaxed manner. This patrol symbolized "presence" without threat and as such did not introduce instability to the situation.

United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)

Introduction. As a by-product of the end of the Cold War, superpower support of left and right wing ideological factions in Central America rapidly faded while the local power struggle remained volatile. In November 1988 several Central American regional players asked the United Nations Secretary-General to conduct on-site verification of some of the conditions of the "Esquipulas II" agreement for resolution of the Central American conflict. Part of the United Nations Observers' task was to patrol the Gulf of Fonseca (which borders El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua) which had in the past been used "... as a supply line over which the leftist Nicaraguan Sandinista forces provisioned the Salvadoran FMLN guerrillas."* In early 1990, the Argentine Government agreed to provide the UN with four naval patrol boats and crews. They arrived in Honduras in June 1990.

Mandate. The Security Council's mandate called for (among other things) verification of the cessation of aid to irregular forces and insurrectionist movements.

This required the on-site observers to:

- monitor areas reported to harbor irregulars and insurrectionists.
- monitor, on a regular basis, land, sea and air borders.
- investigate immediately any alleged violations of the agreed undertakings to cease aiding factions.

Force. The Argentine Naval Force comprised four DABUR-class Fast Patrol Boats and 29 personnel, comprising boat crews, a Squadron Commander and a mobile

* These facts were garnered from Juan Carlos Neves, *United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations in the Gulf of Fonseca by Argentine Navy Units* (Newport: Naval War College, 1993). This report contains a full account of the Argentine Naval contribution to this United Nations operation.

maintenance team. The patrol boats, originally armed with 2-20mm and 2-12.7mm guns, were completely de-armed for the operation at the insistence of the UN. The vessels were painted white with the words "United Nations" in black on their hulls, and they flew the UN flag at the masthead.

Conduct of Operations. The first fifteen days of operations were utilized by the patrol boat crews to conduct area familiarization and check navigational accuracy of aids and charts. On patrol, crews were accompanied by at least one UN observer whose task, assisted by the crew, was to identify and report all contacts in order to establish regular maritime traffic patterns. In this way, non-regular or suspicious movements or behavior could be more readily identified. Patrols took place in the Gulf of Fonseca, and in the rivers discharging into it. Initially operations took place within Honduran and Nicaraguan waters and after September 1990 in Salvadoran waters also. Night patrols were commenced in September 1990 and at this time combined patrols in which an observer and an Argentine Navy officer were embarked in light helicopters were also conducted.

Command and Control. It has been reported that this was "the first occurrence of ships being given over entirely to UN control."¹⁵ Indeed one Argentine naval officer's report on the operation stated "It was clear from the beginning that the naval group would be under UN command and authority in accordance with Security Council Resolution 644/89."¹⁶ The fact was however that full Argentine command and control of the boats was retained by placing them under the authority of the Argentine Squadron Commander, who "had full command responsibility for the FPBs

including the Squadron's readiness as well as organizational and administrative matters."¹⁷ Furthermore, the Squadron Commander "came under the authority of the Argentine Chief of Naval Operations for deployment and recall of ships and personnel."¹⁸ Operational command and control was also effectively exercised by the Argentine Squadron Commander. From his position in the Verification Center San Lorenzo,* he reported directly to the UN-appointed Chief of the Verification Center, and was directly involved in the planning of the patrol boat patterns of patrol. It may be the case that the embarked UN observer had some limited tactical control over the patrol boat's operations; however, the Argentine Commanding Officer had "full responsibility for [the boat's] . . . navigational and operational safety."¹⁹

ROE. The United Nations insisted that the Argentine patrol boats be completely unarmed for ONUCA patrol duties, even to the extent of turning down an Argentine proposal to keep some dismantled weapons onboard for purposes of self-defense. The UN position was that the Argentine mission in support of the mandate was merely to patrol, observe and report — and that the patrol boats did not have any rights to detain or inspect vessels.

Comments. The Argentine contribution to ONUCA is a good example of an active naval contribution to a low level scenario. With a peace settlement in place , but uncertainty over the actions of local insurgent or irregular groups, there was a certain element of risk to the naval craft and their crews. While Argentina judged this risk to be low enough to allow them to commit their (unarmed) forces to the operation, they

* Later renamed as the Verification Center Fonseca.

monitored and controlled the employment of their forces by judiciously placing their Squadron Commander within the local UN organization. It is unlikely that nations would commit naval forces, or indeed land forces, to such an operation without such a national safeguard.

Mid Level Operations

United Nations Transitional Authority Cambodia (UNTAC)²⁰

Introduction. The Agreement on the settlement of conflict, reached in late 1991 between the four major political factions in Cambodia, invited the United Nations Security Council to establish the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia and gave the UN "all powers necessary" to ensure the implementation of the agreement. The military component of UNTAC, under the UN Force Commander(FC), included a naval element.

Mandate. UNTAC had seven components: Human Rights, Civil Administration, Electoral, Police, Repatriation, Rehabilitation and Military. The military component was charged with several main functions: verification of the withdrawal from Cambodia and non-return of all categories of foreign forces and their arms and equipment; supervision of the cease-fire and related measures, including regroupment, cantonment, disarming and demobilization of forces of the Cambodian parties; weapons control, including monitoring the cessation of outside military assistance, locating and confiscating caches of weapons and military supplies throughout Cambodia, storing of the arms and equipment of the cantoned and the demobilized military forces; assisting with mine clearance, including training and mine-awareness

programs.²¹

The naval element of the military component was responsible for patrolling the coastal and inland waterways of Cambodia in order to monitor and report any external or internal military activity which might disrupt transitional arrangements. The naval element also transported personnel of the electoral component into remote areas and further assisted the civil authorities by reporting various observed illegal activities (smuggling, logging, fishing, etc.). Finally, the naval element also operated a Port Authority which had control over the ports and related activities.

Force. The UN force comprised 215 naval observers. Contributing nations' numbers were as follows: Canada 30, Chile 11 plus 21 marines, New Zealand 31, Philippines 45 plus 42 marines, Russia 5, UK 70, Uruguay 23 plus 21 marines. These personnel operated a variety of small craft including over 30 Cambodian Peoples' Armed Forces (CPAF) coastal and river patrol boats (crewed by CPAF personnel taken from cantonment). The Cambodian craft were used as a cost saving measure. This utilization of these craft reportedly led to an erosion of the perception of impartiality of the naval squadron and opened it to a campaign of disinformation.²²

Conduct of Operations. The naval element was stationed in 14 posts around Cambodia and conducted coastal and river patrols. Patrol length was on average 7 hours and overall each station averaged 55 patrols per month during the operation. The marine units were tasked with providing security for the naval observers and with tasks relating to the regroupment, cantonment and demobilization of the Cambodian Naval Forces.

Command and Control. The Senior Maritime Operations Officer(SMOO) split his staff into two cells — a staff cell responsible for policy and coordination, and a squadron cell responsible for the operation of both the coastal and river group operations. The Port Authority was responsible to both civil administration and military elements, with its military chain of command routing through the SMOO. The SMOO was directly responsible to the FC.

ROE. The military observers (including naval observers) were unarmed. ROE, which applied to battalions and marines, allowed for use of force in self-defense if there was "danger to life." Warning shots were required to be fired from small arms.

Comments. The UNTAC mandate was a clear example of the complexity of tasks that post-Cold War peace support operations may be charged with when involved in nation-building/support. In countries where waterways provide lines of communication for the population, maritime forces will be a key facilitator in ensuring that mandated tasks are carried out.

Royal Naval Operations in the Adriatic

Introduction. In March 1992, UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 743 authorized a UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to safeguard UN monitors in areas between Serbian and Croatian forces. Later that year, in September, UNSCR 776 authorized UNPROFOR to protect relief convoys taking aid to the large refugee population which had been generated by the fighting taking place in the aftermath of Bosnia-Herzegovina's declaration of independence. Military operations arising out of this scenario were complex and involved a number of nations. For the purposes of

illustrating a naval role growing from support for a land contingent to a Mid Level UN sponsored operation, this study will focus on the Royal Navy's involvement in support of the British land contingent of UNPROFOR.

As a result of UNSCR 776, in November 1992 the British Government authorized deployment of an Armored Infantry Battalion Group to the former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Naval forces deployed in support of this land contingent consisted of a detachment of Fleet Air Arm helicopters to provide casualty evacuation and two support ships, berthed in Split, to provide logistical support for the troops in theater.

With the imposition, under UNSCR 781, of the UN's no-fly zone over Bosnia in October 1992, and the resultant higher threat to UNPROFOR personnel, the UK (as a national contingency measure) deployed a carrier task force to the Adriatic to provide direct support (airpower and an Embarked Military Force (EMF)) for the British land contingent. In addition to naval forces already mentioned, the Royal Navy also contributed to the NATO Standing Naval Force (NSNF) which, in amalgamation with WEU maritime forces, conducted embargo operations in the Adriatic. Finally, to appreciate the full scope of maritime operations, mention should also be made of the UK contribution to Danube river embargo operations.

An examination of UK carrier operations will help us understand the complexity and interrelatedness of the various naval groups performing UN related tasks in the Adriatic. While the UK carrier task group remained poised to provide reinforcement, withdrawal and support facilities for the UK land contingent, its escort

was on one occasion (for a four-week period) detached to operate under the tactical control of the NATO Standing Force Commander, reinforcing the embargo operation. The task group's aircraft conducted combat air patrol (CAP), reconnaissance and close air support (CAS) (for *Operation Deny Flight*) under the tactical control of NATO COMAIRSOUTH (Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force (5ATAF)). These aircraft, together with embarked helicopters, also provided surface CAP to the NSNF embargo force, and the Royal Navy helicopters stationed ashore contributed to the casualty evacuation support for other nations involved in UNPROFOR.

Mandate. The UK carrier task group operated in the Adriatic as purely national contingency forces. The forces they contributed to 5ATAF and NSNF operated under authorization provided by UNSCRs which established the embargo, no fly zones and the safe havens.

Force. UK naval contributions to the Adriatic operations, in summary consisted of (as of early 1994):

- a. Naval troop lifting helicopters deployed ashore;
- b. Naval support ships berthed in theater to provide logistical back-up to troops;
- c. A carrier task group; and
- d. Escorts to the combined WEU and NSNF groups conducting embargo operations.

Conduct. In area there was considerable cooperation and coordination between national (UK, French and US carrier) task groups and NATO forces which resulted in establishment of regimes to govern airspace, operating and training areas and exercises, and the sharing of logistical assets. These arrangements were arrived at without formal oversight or control by any one agency, but instead were worked out by various

meetings and communications conducted shortly before and after the various groups arrived on station. NATO's authorization to run the no fly zones (*Deny Flight* operation) and to command and control the embargo operations (*Sharp Guard*) was a significant step forward in simplifying a variety of coordination matters.

Command and Control. The UK carrier task group, its aircraft and the Royal Naval helicopters based ashore all operated under national command and control. The British Government agreed to provide aircraft to conduct a portion of the missions required for the *Deny Flight* and *Sharp Guard* flying schedule, which was planned and executed by 5ATAF. French and US carriers did likewise. Embarked aircraft, when actually airborne on such sorties, came under NATO tactical control for the duration of the sortie. Similarly, support ships and escorts of the UK task group detached to operate in support of the NSNF on *Sharp Guard* duties, again by transferring tactical control of these ships to NATO.

ROE. The UK carrier task group operated under national ROE. Aircraft flying on *Deny Flight* sorties operated under COMAIRSOUTH ROE and ships and aircraft conducting *Sharp Guard* missions operated under COMNAVSOUTH ROE.

Comments. Naval and naval air operations in the Adriatic offer a good insight into the range of support roles that naval forces can provide to land forces ashore. They took place in an archetypal Mid Level operation. The UN mandates were essentially designed to provide humanitarian relief (food convoys and safe havens) to a civilian population in the midst of a civil war. The presence of factions (in this situation major national groups who were heavily armed) which did not consent to the

UN mandates meant that UN forces had to be backed up by a level of force that is threat capability based. In the former Yugoslavia as in Somalia, providing a large portion of this support from international waters off the coast offered major political and military advantages. Local political sensitivities were neither challenged nor upset by asking for basing, transit or overflight for ground or air forces. Militarily, when geography allows, as it did here, support facilities can be concentrated close to the theater of operations without the requirement for further troops to be deployed or utilized in guard duties and with minimum impact on the local population.

High Level Operations

Naval operations in support of United Nations resolutions in both the Korean War and the Persian Gulf War (*Desert Shield/Storm*) are examples of coalition High Level (enforcement) actions. While a detailed study of combat operations and procedures are outside the scope of this paper, it is instructive to consider some coalition aspects of these campaigns from a naval point of view.

Korea

The Korean War began on 25 June 1950 when approximately 100,000²³ North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and invaded the South. A mere seven hours after the initial bombardment which had signalled the start of the war, the United Nations Security Council* met to consider the situation. As a result of this meeting,

* The Soviet representative had been absent from such meetings since January 1950 in protest over the non-recognition of communist China.

they issued a Resolution which called "upon all Members to render every assistance to the United Nations in the execution of this resolution and to refrain from giving assistance to the North Korean authorities."²⁴ United States navy and air forces from the Far East Command were quickly ordered into battle by President Truman to support South Korean resistance to the attack. In light of the success of the North Korean advance, the next resolution on the Korean situation, issued by the Security Council on 27 June, recommended that "the Members of the United Nations furnish such assistance to the Republic of Korea as may be necessary to repel the armed attack and to restore international peace and security in the area." The next day, on 28 June, the US Commander Naval Forces Far East (ComNavFE), Vice Admiral C.T. Joy, received offers of assistance from the Australian, New Zealand and UK navies.

Joy deployed some British warships (the carrier *HMS Triumph* a cruiser and two destroyers) with the US Striking Force, and the other vessels with his escort and blockade forces.

Eventually ships from 10 nations operated under the UN unified Commander in the Korean War.* Interoperability does not seem to have been an issue, perhaps due to the relative lack of sophistication of warships during this time and also because of the recent allied experience of the Second World War. As the British Admiral, Rear Admiral W.G. Andrewes, embarked in *HMS Belfast* wrote:

During the passage of Okinawa, United States tactical signals were brought into force on 30 June. A, large proportion of our commanding

* Australia, Canada, Columbia, France, Thailand, Netherlands, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, United Kingdom and the United States.

officers and communication personnel had, of course, had previous experience of United States procedures during World War II, but the combined exercises with the United States Fleet in March 1950 proved of value. As a result of these exercises, we were already in possession of the United States books and many of us had recent experience with their use. . . It all seemed familiar, joining up in Formation Four Roger, as it was just what we had done so often during the exercises in March with very similar forces. We didn't feel out of things. . . .

Desert Shield

Naval operations to enforce economic sanctions were among the first actions to be taken in support of United Nations measures against Iraq consequent to its invasion of Kuwait. The Maritime Interception Operations (MIO) portion of *Operation Desert Shield*, executed by the Maritime Interception Force (MIF), were conducted in the Red Sea, the Gulfs of Aden and Oman and in the Persian Gulf. Twenty-two nations participated in the MIO, and the effort was coordinated by the US Naval Forces Component, Central Command (NAVCENT), who drafted a plan which combined ships of different nationalities in operating areas, while each ship remained operating under its own national command. A series of monthly coordination meetings was initiated, chaired by NAVCENT, attended by representatives from each participating nation. During these meetings, NAVCENT's plan was approved and the Senior Naval Officer designated in each sector to be the local sector coordinator.* This arrangement worked well as remarks from the *Department of Defense Final Report to Congress on the Conduct of the Persian Gulf War* indicate:

* In the Red Sea and Northern Persian Gulf, these duties were carried out by US Carrier Battle Group and Destroyer Squadron Commanders.

The informal, multilateral MIF command structure achieved international cooperation and superb operational effectiveness. When implementing the sanctions under the UNSC resolutions, each country operated under its own national command directives. Although operational procedures varied, coordination among the Coalition naval forces resulted in an effective multinational effort. Information on operating procedures and tactics was routinely shared among the Coalition naval forces. For example, meetings, exchanges, and briefings among Greek, French, Spanish and US MIF participants in the Red Sea served to increase mutual understanding and standardize operating methods developed during years of NATO, Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS), and various bilateral exercises greatly improved the Coalition's ability to work together effectively.

In a another remark from the same report, commenting on the rapid and smooth implementation of the MIO, the author states that this

. . . was directly the product of the extensive experience several of the key navies had accumulated. Importantly, during the "Tanker War" phase of the Iran-Iraq War, five European nations (members of both the Western European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)) and the United States conducted operations that protected reflagged merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf. Although these operations like Earnest Will (the name of the US effort) were separately mounted by each participating state, substantial collective experience in Persian Gulf naval operations was developed.

Desert Storm

Naval warfare requires a tighter and more robust command and control (C2) architecture than the MIF organization to ensure destruction of the enemy and protection of own forces. With a considerable threat posed to coalition naval forces from Iraqi air, surface and mine assets, planning for naval offensive operations as part of Desert Storm required adoption of new C2 methods. NAVCENT restructured his command organization into, *inter alia*, two carrier battle forces (Red Sea and Persian

Gulf), an amphibious task force, a surface combatant force in the Persian Gulf and mine countermeasure (MCM) forces. He continued to command a MIF and various support assets for the forementioned forces. NAVCENT "exercised overall control of all warfare areas at sea"²⁵ and employed the US Navy's Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) concept. To operate this type of organization effectively required coalition navies to transfer operational and tactical control of some of their forces to NAVCENT.

The Iraqi naval surface threat was neutralized by coalition forces from the navies of the US, UK, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These and other forces conducted operations under the control of the Antisurface Warfare (ASuW) Commander. He in turn delegated some of his duties to subordinate commanders, one of whom, responsible for protection of the underway replenishment area and coalition combat logistics ships, was a Canadian naval commander. Operating as an integrated ASuW force, coalition navies destroyed or damaged 143 Iraqi naval vessels, effectively wiping out the Iraqi navy in a three-week period. The DOD official report on the Persian Gulf war stated:

In addition to the US and the GCC states' navies, surface combatants from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, and the United Kingdom (UK) participated in ASuW operations. Only US, UK, Kuwaiti and Saudi surface combatants were involved in offensive ASuW operations against the Iraqi Navy. The GCC navies patrolled their coastal waters and defended Coalition facilities near shore against possible surprise attacks by Iraqi special forces operating from small boats. Other Coalition surface combatants provided fleet defense and protected the aircraft carriers and combat logistics forces. For example, France placed one frigate under US operational control on 15 February to carry out escort missions for the coalition's combat logistics ships; however it was not authorized to

engage in offensive operations.

. . . The most effective ASuW tactic used by the Coalition was the British Lynx helicopter, working with the controlling SH-60B, firing the Sea Skua missile.

In AAW with its more defensive posture, greater integration was to be found and as the report stated:

For example on 15 February . . . 21 surface combatants including six Aegis and three NTU cruisers and 12 US, UK, Australian, Spanish and Italian destroyers and frigates were under the AAW commander's control for AAW defense of coalition naval forces.

In mine warfare:

A British MCM force joined with the USMCMG to conduct most MCM operations during Operation Desert Storm. The British MCM group was under the operational control of the UK's Senior Naval Officer Middle East, but tactical control was given to the USMCMG commander.

Comment. The simple and straight forward transfer of command and control of the UK, Australian and New Zealand warships to the Unified Commander in the Korean War contrasts markedly with the more complex arrangements in *Desert Shield/Storm*. The latter arrangements nevertheless proved effective in conducting offensive and defensive operations at sea utilizing coalition forces provided from a large number of countries with different naval capabilities and differing degrees of willingness to submit to US designed and led operations, under UN sanction.

NOTES

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16. Juan Carlos Neves, *United Nations Peace-Keeping Operations in the Gulf of Fonseca by Argentine Naval Units*, Strategy & Campaign Department Report 01-93 (Newport: Naval War College, 1993), p. 15.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 17.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 15.
20. Information on UNTAC naval operations was provided by Commander P.W. Holihead, Royal Navy - UNTAC Naval Squadron Commander.
21. United Nations. Secretary-General Spokesman's Office, *UNITED NATIONS TRANSITIONAL AUTHORITY IN CAMBODIA (UNTAC) INFORMATION NOTE*. 8412800;#4/5; 9-17-92.
22. This view was recorded in the Naval Squadron Commander's report.
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24. Resolution adopted by the Security Council, June 25, 1950. Malcolm W. Cagle and Frank A. Manson, *Ibid.*, p. 27.
25. Department of Defense, *op. cit.* in note 11, p. 253.

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